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ABSTRA2
Thisstudy tests for the empirical relationship between layoffs and
the economic performance of workers who remain after the layoffs.
Previous studies performed in laboratory settings have often found
increases in the efficiency of workers after layoffs. This analysis is
the first to test for this relationship using operating data from a set
of similar establishments. Within the framework of a modified Cobb-
Douglas production function, layoffs do not influence subsequent produc-
tivity in the establishments in this study's sample. It is also
suggested that the seniority systems governing layoffs and the high
levels of capital intensity in these establishments may help explain the
difference between the findings in the laboratory studies and those
obtained in this analysis.
Prof. Casey Ichniowski
Uris 713
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
New York, NY 10027I. INTRODUCTION
While many aspects of the decision to layoff workers have been the
focus of various economic studies, a growing body of psychologically-
based studies of worker behavior suggests another dimension of layoffs
yet to be explored in the economic literature: the impact of layoffs on
those not laid off --the"survivorst' These studies describe a set of
potential cognitive or emotional responses among those who remain after a
layoff that can affect their effort, attention or motivation as well as
their attitudes toward their managers or their jobs. These responses
among the workers remaining after layoffs, in turn, will affect the
workers' performance on the job. Importantly, empirical tests in these
studies consistently find significant effects of layoffs on survivors'
work performance. However, all existing empirical tests have been
conducted in laboratory settings. Here, the empirical research is
extended by examining how the productivity of a set of nine manufacturing
plants changes in response to layoffs. Unlike the existing laboratory
studies, this analysis does not find significant differences in the
economic performance of these plants in periods following layoffs.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AN]) TUEEQUITYTHEORY FRANEWORK FOR SURVIVOR
REACTIONS
The existing laboratory studies are designed and interpeted within
the framework of equity theory developed by Adams.1 An individual
perceives inequity when he "perceives that his job inputs and/or outcomes
stand psychologically in an obverse relation to the inputs and outcomes
•tt2 of those in a relevant reference group. In work organizations,
outcomes are broadly defined as pay, benefits, status, and other at-
tributes that can be considered as rewards or compensation for the job.2
Inputs are the attributes the employee brings to the employment exchange:
human capital traits, demographic characteristics, "and,very important-
ly, the effort he expends on the job."3 Much of the empirical research
in organizational psychology based on equity theoryanalyzes what happens
to workers who experience "positive inequity"; that is, whenan employee
perceives that his outcomes-to-inputs ratio exceeds that of relevant
coworkers.4 Traditionally, the outcome-to-input ratio in theselabora-
tory-controlled studies is altered by increasing the compensation of one
worker above that of a coworker for continued work on thesame task. In
the next round of these tasks, the peformance of "overpaid"employees
improves relative to that of the coworker and relative to the performance
of workers in control groups.5
Recently, in an extension of these studies on "positive inequity,"
attention has focused on the performance of survivors of layoffs.Here,
it is suggested that when a coworker is laid off, the survivormay
experience positive inequity. Similar to previous results, these labor-
atory studies document that, after a layoff, the suvivor performs signi-
ficantly better relative to his previous performance and to the perform-
ances of workers in a control group.6 The interpretation placed on these
results is that layoffs primarily arouse guilt or anxiety in the survivor
that stimulates improved performance rather than arousinganger (toward
the experimenter who laid off the worker) which might stimulate increased
performance.
The research on survivors also documents the importance of certain
intervening variables on the behavior of survivors. Mechanisms that
accentuate the psychological responses of survivors should accentuate
performance differentials as well. For example, the method or decision3
rule for the layoffs may affect behavioralresponses. In a study that
tests this hypothesis,7 layoffs were administered in two differentways:
(1) by seemingly random selection criteria, and (2)according to previous
performance of the workers. When layoffs seemed random, performance
increases of survivors were significantly greater than increasesof
control group workers. However, when layoffs were decidedon merit,
performance increases of survivors and control group workers were not
significantly different.
The growing body of empirical findings from laboratory studiesmay
provide economists with important information on how to model the labor
input in the firm's production process. Specifically, these studies
suggest that the marginal effect of a decrease in labor mayvary accord-
ing to how the labor input is reduced. For example, the marginal impact
of a decrease in labor hours may be different whena worker quits and
when a worker is laid off if remaining workers responddifferently in
these two situations. If the findings in the studies described above do
in fact apply to firms in the economy, models of production willrequire
an added degree of complexity. This study, then, is the first to test
for the empirical relationship between layoffs and subsequent economic
performance with operating data from a sample of firms.
III. PLANT-LEVEL PRODUCTION: SANPLE, NODEL AND DATA
The sample for this study includes ninepaper mills in the same
four-digit industrial classification (SIC no. 2621). All are owned by
the same parent corporation and all have unionized production workforces.
Monthly observations on the operations and layoff experience of these4
mills cover the period from January 1976 to September 1982. Due to
incomplete data, particularly on the number of layoffs, certain monthly
observations are not included in the sample. Individual panels on a
given mill range from 28 months to 68 months. A full complement of
layoff, input, and output data needed to estimate the models below is
available for 527 mill-months.
Analyzing changes in workers' economic contribution after layoffs
with actual operating data is clearly needed to consider whether the
existing set of findings can be extended beyond laboratory settings.
However, outside controlled settings, the number of factors other than
layoffs that influence the productivity of workers, even in a set of
plants in the same four-digit industry, will increase dramatically.
Also, with more than one factor of production, the marginal product of
employees who remain after a layoff should increase as the ratio of other
inputs to labor increases. As a first step in modelling the multivariate
determinants of the economic performance of these nine mills, consider a
simple Cobb-Douglas production function:8
Q A K1 E2 L's' (Equation 1)
where K, E and L are capital, energy and labor inputs. Aware of the
inability of standard economic production functions, such as Equation 1,
to explain intra- and inter-firm variations in productivity,9 field
investigations of the mills were conducted which led to certain modifica-
tions of this function. Generally, limiting the sample to mills in the
same four-digit industry classification did not insure homogeneous inputs
or output. Before considering how to model the impact of layoffs on the5
labor input L, this heterogeneity of economic inputs and output will be
addressed.
A value-added output measure, the standard price-weighted index used
when heterogeneity in output exists, was not available --norwould it
have been appropriate.0 As an alternative, tons of paper produced is
the variable used to measure Q. The heterogeneity in output in this
sample is directly associated with differences in departments or stages
of the production process. Several dummy variables indicating the
presence of various departments that alter the paper products are there-
fore incorporated in equation 1 as direct controls for output heterogene-
ity. For example, the difference between sheeted white paper and
newsprint corresponds directly to the presence of bleaching and convert-
ing departments in mills that produce the former product. The coeffi-
cients on such department dummies are expected to be negative as these
optional departments use additional labor, capital, and energy inputs to
produce a given tonnage of paper. Associated with the vector of produc-
tion department dummy variables (D) is a corresponding vector of
department-specific capitl value variables (1(V). These more detailed
input variables are incorporated in Equation 1 as follows:
Q =A(1+D))(V)'(E)2 (L) (Equation 2)
After a logarithmic transformation and rearranging terms, equation (2)
can be expressed:11
£n Q£n A +(D)+ iV1) +2(nE) +y(2nL) (Equation 3)6
The PD variables are constants for any one plant over the sevenyears
for which data are available; therefore they serve as controls for
categories of plant-specific effects. To control completely for plant-
specific productivity effects, PD is expanded in subsequent analyses
into a complete set of mill dummy variables. The energy input, E, is
defined as total BTU's used in the production process.(The input and
output variables are described in greater detail in the Data Appendix.
This Appendix also describes the deflators and depreciation schemes
used to construct the K variables.) Before describing the specifica-
tion of the labor input, it should be noted that these unconventional
elaborations for specifying inputs and output in this otherwise conven-
tional functional form improve the model of the production process.
Specifically, equation (3) accounts for a much larger proportion of
production variation in this sample than do more conventional
specifications. 12
To specify the labor input, the statistic available for these plants
is similar to statistics often used to measure labor input in other
productivity studies: total hourly manhours reported (RL) in monthly
payroll calculations. The RL statistic for labor input clearly decreases
as layoffs occur by the number of manhours that had previously been
worked by the laid-off employees. Iloreover, the logarithmic Cobb-Douglas
function in equation (3) already allows for the fact that the marginal
product of labor will increase as total labor hours decreases according
to the product, y L. However, the research described in Section II
suggests that when layoffs decrease the level of labor input, the change
in the marginal product of labor may be different from the change in the7
marginal product of labor that occurs after a similar reduction in
manhours that is not the result of a layoff. For example, the workforce
may react differently after a layoff than it would after employees quit
or after overtime rates decrease. If the empirical findings of the
previous laboratory research hold for this sample, layoffsmay tempor-
arily produce above average increases in the marginal product of laboras
survivors work at above average levels of efficiency.
To allow labor hours to vary in their efficiency, let the true
measure of labor input, L, be some variable proportion of the RL statis-
tic according to the equation:
L =(1+X)RL (Equation 4)
A is positive when factors cause an hour of labor to be above theaverage
level of efficiency, ceteris paribus. Above-normal work efforton the
part of survivors who experience anxiety or guilt in periods after
layoffs would, therefore, be associated with positive values of A.
While the central finding in the existing studies is that survivors
will increase their performance, the discussion in these studies allows
that decreases in the performance of survivorsmay occur if a psychologi-
cal reaction other than anxiety or guilt is the predominantresponse
among remaining workers. For example, angry workers wishing to retaliate
against management would lead to negative values of A, ceteris paribus.
To allow layoffs to be associated with changes in the effort and effi-
ciency of survivors, let the layoff rate, LO, provide information on A.
Substituting 6L0 for A in equation (4), one obtains:
L =(1+6LO)RL (Equation 5)8
Substituting equation (5) into equation (3) and rearranging terms, one
obtains: 13
£n Q 2.nA+ + 1(n V) + 2(2n E) + y(.Qn RL) + yôLO
(Equation 6)
Managers report layoffs in terms of number of employees; therefore,
the layoff rate LO is defined as the ratio of the number of production
employees laid off in month t to the total number of production employees
in month t-1. Since the reported layoffs may not have occurred until
late in the given month, the reaction of survivors might not be evident
until the month after the layoff. The equation (6) model then will also
be estimated with a lagged layoff rate variable. If survivor reactions
are indicated by the coefficients on these layoff rate variables, the
change in labor efficiency may only be temporary. To be able to track
whether any initial survivor reaction dissipates over time, the empirical
specification will be expanded to examine changes in the labor produc-
tivity during the first one-half year after a layoff. That is, output is
specified as a function of the layoff rate in the current month and the
layoff rates in the six previous months as well. Accordingly, this
specification can be written:
ln ln A + a(P]D) + 1(ln KV)
+ 2(ln Et) + y(ln RLt)
6
+ .LO_. (Equation 7)
i=O
1 19
As in equation (6), p. = Thedifferential impact of
layoffs on output in period t as a method to reduce manhours will be
given by: y[oLO + +
6t_6Lc_6]Similarly, the cumula-
tive effect over six months of a layoff in period t on output relative to
a similar decrease in manhours that occurs for other reasons will be
given by: yLOt[o + In equation (6) or (7), values of 6
can be isolated by dividing the coefficient on a given layoff rate
variable by the coefficient on the RL variable. The semi-logarithmic
specifications in equations (6) and (7), then, are used to estimate the
relationship between layoff rates and subsequent productivity changes.'4
If survivors are spurred to above average levels of efficiency, then the
coefficient(s) on the layoff rate variable(s) should be positive (assum-
ing a positive coefficient on the RL variable). If reactions which
hinder performance, such as anger toward management, are the dominant
responses among survivors, the coefficient(s) on the layoff rate vari-
able(s) should be negative. To see whether layoffs do in fact lead to
different changes in productivity than do other fluctuations in manhours,
estimates from the production equations are now presented.
IV. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRODUCTIVITY TO PRIOR
LAYOFFS
When equation (6) is estimated, the coefficients presented in Table
(1) are obtained. Column (1) presents estimates obtained when equation
(6) includes only the layoff rate of the current period. Column (2)
replicates the column (1) specification except that the dummy variables
for the presence of certain production departments (the D variables) are
replaced by a complete set of eight plant dummy variables. In neither10
specification is the coefficient on the layoff rate significantly differ-
ent from zero. Also, in both the column (1) and (2) specifcations, the
coefficient on the RL variable, y, is approximately .7. The ratio of the
layoff coefficient to the RL coefficient, which yields the estimate of ô,
is also judged not to be significantly different from zero.15
When the column (1) and column (2) specifications are expanded to
include six periods of lagged layoff rate variables, the coefficients in
columns (3) and (4) are obtained. Not one coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the .10 level. As judged by an F-test comparing
the column (3) and (4) models to similar models without any layoff rate
variables for the same N =481sample,16 the entire complement of layoff
rate variables does not add to the explanatory power of the models. The
coefficient on the layoff rate lagged one period in the column (4)
specification has a p-value that is just greater than .10; however, when
the layoff rate variables are added to the model, other coefficients in
the model have lower levels of significance. As a result, even in this
specification, the layoff rate variables do not improve the model
significantly.
As described in Section II, an important theme in previous research
is the importance of intervening variables that might mediate the effects
of survivors' reactions.17 While these studies have only documented
increases in performance after layoffs, they do suggest that decreases in
performance may also be possible. It might therefore be argued that the
insignificant coefficients on the layoff rate variables in Table 1 simply
reflect the fact that layoffs in certain mills may lead to strong posi-
tive effects on survivors' effort and efficiency, while in others the
effects may be negative because the mills are subject to different11
intervening variables. To test for this possibility, equations are es-
timated separately for each mill. Coefficients on the layoff rate and
lagged layoff rate variables from these nine mill-specific equations are
presented in Table (2).
Among all coefficients, very few are significantly different from
zero. In the case of mill 5 in which two of the seven layoff rate
coefficients are significantly different from zero, one is positive (line
2a) and the other negative (line 2d). Mill 1 does exhibit a clear
pattern of negative coefficients, but this set of variables does not add
to the explanatory power of the model without any layoff rate variables.
Mill 9, on the other hand, exhibits a consistent pattern of positive
coefficients, but only one coefficient (for the layoff rate lagged five
periods) is significantly different from zero. Despite the significant
coefficient, the model is not improved significantly by the set of layoff
rate variables since the significance levels of other coefficients in the
model decline when the layoff variables are added. Moreover, one would
have expected the strongest survivor effects in the month of the layoff
or the first month after the layoff --notafter a lag of five months.
Taken as a whole, the empirical results for the whole sample in Table 1
or for each mill individually in Table 2 provide no evidence that the
change in productivity after a layoff is different from the changes that
occur after similar decreases in employment that are not the result of
layoffs.12
a Table 1: The Effect of Prior Layoffs on Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
obsevations 527 527 481 481
1. layoff rate -.013 -.104 .003 -.099
(.200) (.189) (.200) (.189)
2. lagged layoff rates
(a) one period -.173 -.305
(.197) (.186)
(b) two periods .058 -.051
(.196) (.186)
(c) three periods .102 -.023
(.196) (.185)
(d) four periods .152 .034
(.194) (.183)
(e) five periods .255 .153
(.195) (.183)
(f) six periods .264 .172
(.195) (.183)
3. Other Controls b c b c
R2 .940 .947 .945 .951
a -Standarderrors in parentheses
b -Othercontrols include those specified in equation (6). Detailed
descriptions of these controls are presented in the Dta Appendix.
c -Controlsare the same as those in note b, except the PD controls
for the presence or absence of certain production departments is
replaced by a complete set of eight mill dummies.13
V.DISCUSSION AND INPLICATIONS
The results of this study clearly indicate that the empirical
findings in previous laboratory studies do not necessarily describe the
experience inside actual firms. On the other hand, this study considers
the relationship between layoffs and subsequent productivity in only nine
establishments. It does not change the validity of the results obtained
in controlled experimental settings. To understand the difference
between the results obtained in this study and those in the studies
described in Section II, field investigations of the mills and interviews
with managers were conducted.
In field investigations, the continuous flow production process in
these paper mills was observed to be highly capital-intensive'8 and
machine-paced. Even if strong worker reaction effects (of anxiety,
guilt, or anger) were engendered in response to layoffs, such a
technology may severely limit the degree to which any changes in effort
or attention on the part of survivors affect productivity. That is, in
such a capital-intensive setting, attendance of workers may be more
critical than changes in effort or attention of the workers.
Also described in Section II, one laboratory study suggests that the
decision rule used for layoffs mediate the impact of layoffs on survivor
performance. Layoffs based on merit did not produce a significant change
in survivors' performance, while layoffs decided by a seemingly random
decision did. As described by managers in interviews, the contractual
provisions governing layoffs in these nine unionized mills all rely
heavily on strict seniority systems. While this is clearly not a random
or merit-based system, it might reasonably be argued that a seniority-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































survivors that would lead to changes in their effort.or performance.
First, anxiety would probably not be engendered by the layoffs, since
there would be little uncertainty about who would be laid offnext. Even
for the more junior workers at greater risk after thelayoff, there may
not be an increase in effort since these workers have little controlover
their fate. Furthermore, since the employees'representatives took part
in developing the contractual decision rule for layoffs, survivorsmay be
less likely to experience either guilt oranger.
While this study takes an important first step in moving theempiri-
cal study from laboratory settings to settings ofexisting work organiza-
tions, these final considerations point out the kinds of field research
that provide further insights. Specifically, investigation of the
layoff-productivity relationship in nonunion settings and particularly in
organizations where decision rules other than seniority-based systems are
in effect may produce very different results than those obtained in this
study. Research in these settings may also help to reconcile the results
of this study with those obtained in the previous laboratory research.16
DATA APPENDIX: Descriptions and Definitions of Output, Input
and Layoff Rate Variables
Class of Variable Definition of Measure Used
(Variable Symbol)
1. Output (Q) Tonsof Paper Produced
2. Production Departments Mills with different combinations of produc-
Present in the Mills tion departments produce different types of
(D) final paper products. Dummy variables are
included for the presence of:a pulping de-
partment; a bleaching and dyeing department;
a converting department (either sheeting or
coating operations); and a set of variables
for whether the mill has two, three, four or
five or more paper machine departments.
3. Department-specific Total depreciated, deflated value of assets
in each department in the mills. The depre-
value of capital (Ky) ciation schedule is the one used by the mills'
management --astraight-line depreciation ap-
plied over engineering estimates of the as-
sets' expected life. The deflators used are
capital price indices in Economic Report of
the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1981), p. 229. Table
B-57, "Producer Price Indexes for Major Com-
modity Groups --Machineryand Equipment". In
addition to the production departments that
are present in some mills and absent in
others, as listed in line 2 above, the follow-
ing departments are present in all mills:
wrapping and shipping; energy generation; pol-
lution and recycling; and buildings not else-
where classified. Each department has a total
value of capital variable calculated for it.
4. Energy (E) Total BTU's of energy consumed in production
at the mill
5. Labor (L) Production Workforce Manhours as reported in
Monthly Payroll Calculations
6. Layoff Rate (LO) Each of the nine mill managers made available
confidential copies of U.S. Department of
Labor's "Monthly Report on Labor Turnover."
A layoff statistic (distinct from other sorts
of separations) is reported for each month.
Since this statistic is reported in units of
employees, the layoff rate is the ratio of
production employees laid off in month t
to the total number of production employees
in the previous month.17
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